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Everywhere a Cluck-Cluck: Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l 
Sales Corp.* 
 
MICHAEL P. MALLOY† 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Whenever I teach a contracts course and reach the subject of contract in-
terpretation, I am tempted to place  Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Inter-
national Sales Corp.1 on the desk, wind it up like one of those little plastic 
chicks you get during the holidays, and just let it run. The case would whirr 
and cluck-cluck through a range of issues, imparting knowledge and under-
standing to my students in a methodical, clear, and effective manner. Of how 
many cases (or class discussions) can one honestly make such a claim? The 
opinion by Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly2 is well written, incredibly thor-
ough, witty, and probably one of the most helpful guides to the use of extrinsic 
sources imaginable. These qualities earn the case my vote as “best contracts 
case.” 
 
2. Case Summary 
 
For those only casually acquainted with edible birds, Frigaliment begins 
its analysis of the dispute between the parties with a startling question: 
 
The issue is, what is chicken? Plaintiff says ‘chicken’[3] means a young 
chicken, suitable for broiling and frying. Defendant says ‘chicken’ 
means any bird of that genus that meets contract specifications on 
weight  and  quality,  including  what  it  calls  ‘stewing  chicken’ and 
 
                                                          
* Copyright © 2017 Michael P. Malloy. 
† Distinguished Professor & Scholar, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law. 
J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1976); Ph.D., Georgetown University (1983). 
1 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
2 Shortly before this case, Judge Friendly left private practice and was appointed to the 
Second Circuit. He volunteered, given his limited past trial court experience, to sit as a district 
court judge in the Frigaliment case. DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF 
HIS ERA 60, 81, 315 (2012). Is it possible that great judges make for great cases? 
3 Here, and consistently throughout the opinion, Judge Friendly uses single quotation 
marks. I do not know why, but I would like to think that he realized that the opinion was worthy 
of quotation–in double quotation marks– with his own internal quotation marks already pread-
justed to singles. Commentators almost uniformly miss this usage and will use double quotation 
marks when repeating this passage in an indented quotation. See, e.g., Aaron D. Goldstein, The 
Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 73, 110 (2013) (misplacing Friendly's single quotation marks with doubles in 
direct, indented quotation). 
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plaintiff pejoratively terms ‘fowl.’ Dictionaries give both meanings, 
as well as some others not relevant here.4 
 
In Frigaliment, the purchaser of fresh, frozen “chicken” brought an action 
against the seller for breach of warranty. The purchaser said that it had wanted 
chickens suitable for broiling and frying, and that was what the contract re-
quired. The district court reviewed the text of the contract and applied a variety 
of extrinsic sources to determine what the term “chicken” meant. The court 
held that the purchaser had failed to sustain its burden of proving that the word 
“chicken,” as used in the contract, referred only to broilers and fryers and did 
not include stewing chickens. 
In reaching this result, Frigaliment considers, in succession, a variety of 
interpretive sources. First, of course, there is the language of the contract itself. 
“Since the word ‘chicken’ standing alone is ambiguous, I turn first to see 
whether the contract itself offers any aid to its interpretation.”5 Second, Judge 
Friendly considers trade usage and other sources of extrinsic evidence. Is it 
possible “that there was a definite trade usage that ‘chicken’ meant ‘young 
chicken”’?6 We would need to know more about common practices in the 
trade.7 Third, if the transaction occurred within an identifiable regulatory con-
text, it is possible “that the contract incorporated [the Department of Agricul-
ture's] regulations by reference,”8 which might help explain the meaning and 
effect of the term. Fourth, the structure and pricing of the relevant market 
might suggest what the term “chicken” would mean in the context of their 
contract.”9 Finally, the conduct of the parties during the operation of the con-
tract--what the UCC would call the course of performance10--might reveal, by 
inference from their behavior, what the parties thought the term meant in the 
contract that they were carrying out.11 Reviewing the results of each of these 
sources of contract interpretation, Judge Friendly concludes that the plaintiff 
had failed to carry its burden to demonstrate “that ‘chicken’ was used in the 
narrower rather than in the broader sense.”12 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Frigaliment, 190 F. Supp. at 117. 
5 Id. at 118. 
6 Id. at 119. 
7 Cf. id. at 119-29 (discussing evidence from which relevant trade usage might be estab-
lished terms). 
8 Id. at 120. 
9 Id. 
10 See U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001) (defining “course of 
performance” to mean “a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular transaction” 
under specified circumstances involving “repeated occasions for performance”). 
11 Frigaliment, 190 F. Supp. at 120-121. 
12 Id. at 121. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
The heart of the decision is the identification and analysis of pertinent 
sources of extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the contract term in conten-
tion. One must remember that this case arose before enactment of the UCC. 
Currently, what sources might we look to?13 The UCC gives us a compact set 
of interpretive rules, none of which are inconsistent with Frigaliment.14 How-
ever, post-UCC cases continue to recognize that extrinsic sources that aid in 
interpretation are broader than those identified in section 1-303 of the UCC,15 
and they continue to cite Frigaliment and similar cases as pertinent authority. 
Certainly in a commercial case like Frigaliment, part of the defining context 
would be the market structure for products with particular commercial and 
consumer applications, and that is still likely to be so in contemporary cases.16 
Frigaliment remains a case cited with authority17 and affection18 today. 
 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (provid-
ing interpretive rules). 
14 See U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM'N 2017) (defining course of 
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, thus setting their parameters); id. § 2-202 
(allowing for the use of these sources to “explain[] or supplement[]” written contract terms). 
15 Courts and commentators have sometimes been criticized for departing from UCC ter-
minology in this regard. See, e.g., David G. Epstein, Adam L. Tate, & William Yaris, Fifty: 
Shades of Grey--Uncertainty About Extrinsic Evidence and Parol Evidence After All These UCC 
Years, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 925, 926-27 (2013) (“Too often, the reported opinions in post-UCC 
cases that involve a dispute over interpreting a term in or adding terms to a written contract for 
the sale of goods do not use the language of the UCC. Instead, attorneys and judges use (and 
misuse) the terms ‘extrinsic evidence,’ ‘parol evidence,’ and the ‘parol evidence rule,’ rather 
than the language of Article 2.”). However, I fail to see how such flexibility in terminology has 
led to misapplication of the applicable legal principles or that--for example--Frigaliment would 
have reached a materially different result if it had been a UCC case. In any event, one cannot 
give much weight to anyone who alludes to E. L. James's 2011 erotic romance novel in the title 
of a scholarly article, or, for that matter, in a footnote in an otherwise refreshing analysis of 
Frigaliment. 
16 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying UCC 
provisions and looking to market structure and pricing in analyzing the contract at issue). But 
cf. Malloy on ProCD p. 999 (arguing that ProCD is the worst contracts case, on other grounds). 
17 See, e.g., Rossi v. N.Y. City Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 8 N.Y.S.3d 25, 33 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2015) (citing Frigaliment, considering the definition of “goods”). 
18 See, e.g., Royal Am. Mgmt, Inc. v. WCA Waste Corp., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1280 (N.D. 
Fla. 2016) (citing Frigaliment, considering “a more difficult question: did the chicken or the 
egg come first?”). 
